This is a major problem for the coalition. A few outrageously manipulated polls notwithstanding, Afghans obviously see the coalition as an occupying force.
With war crimes committed by some rogue U. Sermons in mosques—even in central Kabul—frequently reflect a growing exasperation with U. While some of the recent violence during protests following the burning of the Quran in the United States may have been caused by extremists, these demonstrations clearly show that most Afghan people are frustrated.
President Karzai is trying to channel popular sentiment by passing laws inspired by fundamentalists. But Karzai is not the winner in this—insurgents are clearly benefiting most from rising anti-Western feelings. When General Petraeus, the architect of the surge in Iraq and next CIA director, arrived as the new commander of American forces in Afghanistan in June , he brought a change in strategy but failed to win more support from Afghans.
Reforming the government has fallen off the agenda and the coalition is supporting corrupt officials, particularly in the south, and helping mostly discredited militias that are largely ineffective and always unpopular. And military operations in Kandahar have destroyed many private estates and orchards. Withdrawing Western forces in the coming years will undoubtedly give up territory to the insurgents.
Often, they outperform the local court system. This is one major reason why religion—particularly Islam—matters. It provides an organizing framework for rough justice and a justification for its implementation, and is more likely to be perceived as legitimate by local communities.
Secular groups and governments simply have a harder time providing this kind of justice. A Sharia-based, informal dispute system would almost certainly be frowned upon by those Western donors.
How likely was it that an Afghan government headed by an Ivy League—educated technocrat could beat the Taliban at its own game? Karlin When the Bush administration helped shape the post-Taliban Afghan government, it was still claiming that it had little interest in nation building. Strong presidential systems are appealing because they offer the prospect of determined action.
But the concentration of power inevitably alienates other stakeholders, particularly on the local and regional levels. From the beginning, the Afghan Parliament suffered from a legitimacy deficit.
Afghanistan used an electoral system known as single nontransferable vote SNTV , one of the rarest in the world. There are reasons SNTV is sometimes used in local elections but almost never nationally: Among other things, it allocates votes in a way that depresses the development of political parties. The risks of a presidential system are heightened in divided societies, and Afghanistan is divided along ethnic, religious, tribal, linguistic, and ideological lines—in almost every way possible.
This raises the stakes of political competition, because what matters most is who ends up at the very top. Finally, the system works only if the president is competent.
The now-exiled president, Ashraf Ghani, managed to be all-powerful in theory but resolutely feckless in practice. Despite having been the chair of the Institute for State Effectiveness, his ineffectiveness—reflected in his mercurial style and penchant for micromanagement—infected the entire political system, and little could be done to reverse the trend as long as he remained in office. In addition to fashioning new political institutions, America believed that it could transform the culture of a country.
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About Feedback Funders Support Jobs. Close Menu. Email Address Subscribe. Yes Not now. By — Laura Santhanam Laura Santhanam. Leave your feedback. If there is a message that these people would want to tell President Biden, it would be this: See us.
Do not collude with the Taliban to impose false narratives on our past and our future. Use whatever remaining leverage you have—recognition; high level diplomatic engagement; regional cooperation mechanisms; sanctions; targeted economic embargoes against Taliban leadership—strategically to make the Taliban accountable to the promises they have made to respect our rights and to be inclusive.
All does not have to be lost. We have been shattered countless times and have risen before and we shall rise again. Contact us at letters time. By Rina Amiri.
Rina Amiri, an Afghan American and former U. TIME Ideas hosts the world's leading voices, providing commentary on events in news, society, and culture. We welcome outside contributions. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors.
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